In the present essay, I want to report on my exchange with Derrida concerning the 33-page typescript of Geschlecht III, an exchange that was very important for my own work on Heidegger and Trakl. It is not false humility but a reality check when I say that our exchange was certainly much more important for me than it was for Derrida, even though he was, as always, very generous in his remarks to me in later years about the exchange. As I look over my marginal notes to the 33-page typescript, it seems obvious to me that the bulk of them were no news to him. That is to say, most of my remarks merely corroborated and encouraged the direction of his thinking.
Every now and then I urged caution or ventured a doubt or an objection. 2 Certainly, there seems to be no great interest in the Anglo-American world in either Heidegger's Trakl interpretation or Derrida's reading of it.
While many philosophers continue to brave Heidegger's Hölderlin interpretations, very few take the risk of engaging with Trakl. Why? I am not sure.
Perhaps because of the unsavory atmosphere that suffuses the Trakl world: cocaine, incest, war, suicide-conservative Heideggerians have to wonder why Heidegger was drawn to any of this, and why Derrida would want to make Heidegger's reading of Trakl one of the principal foyers of his reading of Heidegger. Never mind the fact that students of German literature have long said that Trakl rescued the lyre of poetry as it slipped from Hölderlin's hands. Nevermind that Trakl brings Heidegger to reflect on matters that are not addressed anywhere else in his thought-principally the matters of human sexuality, of brother and sister, and of lovers. Specifically, in the Trakl article, Heidegger elaborates the idea of a twofold "blow" or "stroke" of sexuality, namely, the strokes of (1) sexual duality and (2) sexual dissension or discord. It may be that the new waves of scandal lapping against the shores of Heidegger's life make it less likely than ever that students will want to take up Heidegger's and Derrida's readings of Trakl, especially in the United States, where Puritanism continues to reign in the academy, in our political life, and in our military detention camps. Yet there may be some who will not be deterred by accusations of unsavoriness or scandal, and so I will proceed. I do have to apologize for the excessive use of the pronoun "I" in what follows, and can only hope that one or another stray philosopher or poet will find these marginalia of interest. There is no doubt in my mind that the texts by Derrida and Heidegger on Trakl are themselves immensely important, and that Trakl's poetry remains the most haunting and desperate testimony to a desperate and destitute time. Will anyone say that we have left such times behind us?
A word about the chronology and the context of Derrida's typescript and my own response to it: he brought the typescript with him to the Loyola University conference organized by John Sallis in March of 1985;
it was an extension of his Geschlecht II, entitled "Heidegger and the Hand of Man." 3 Derrida himself distributed both texts to the participants in the conference for purposes of discussion. For my own work, both the typescript of Geschlecht III and the conference as a whole were highly stimulating. I had been working on Trakl's poetry for some time-since at least the mid-1970s-and was also being drawn toward the issues of "life" and "animality" in the fundamental ontology of Dasein and in Heidegger's later thought, issues that were later to receive their most telling form in Derrida's Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question (De l'esprit: Heidegger et la question [1987] ). 4 The Essex Conference, "Reading Heidegger," held at Wivenhoe
House May 16-18, 1986, was Heidegger notes that the "peculiarity" of language is that it speaks always to itself alone, and in so doing gathers us to beings and to being (1959, 241, . In "The Way to Language," Heidegger notes that the suffix -sam is the Gothic sama, the Greek a{ ma. This is of course the selfsame a{ ma, "simultaneity," that stands at the center of Derrida's "Ousia and Grammé,"
Schibboleth, and other texts. 11 In the context of placement, Heidegger often writes of die Gegend, the region, or regioning, of beings. Derrida comments on the "toward" of such regioning, implied in the preposition gegen. (11) (12) . Yet how do the rhythms of particular poems relate to the macrorhythm that Heidegger claims he is following rather than himself arbitrarily setting? What precisely is the conversation between thinking and poetizing to which Heidegger constantly appeals?
For Derrida, the appeal to some sort of Zwiegespräch, a conversation between two, is itself a maneuver, a sleight of hand. Or, perhaps, a sleighting of the two hands. Heidegger's is a gesture of modesty and imperiousness at one and the same time: modest insofar as it submits thinking always and everywhere to the poetry of the poet, and imperious insofar as not even the poet will have much to tell the thinker about the essential place of the unspoken poem (13) (14) (15) (16) . According to Heidegger, who multiplies the twosomes in his conversation with the poet (Zwie-falt, Zwie-spalt, Zwie-tracht, Zwie-sprache, Zwie-gespräch, Ent-zwei-ung, Zwist) , the Grundton or tonic of Trakl's unspoken and singular poem will be determined by the emphatic
Ein of E i n Geschlecht. That "one" will prove to have been the place of the placement, and the selection of the poems for commentary will have been guided by it (17) . The selection will proceed so smoothly that Heidegger's placement will seem merely to stumble quite innocently upon these items of evidence-these particular lines by Trakl-which seem to be there just when Heidegger needs them. Yet what is actually happening throughout, as , is that Heidegger is proceeding by the method of "metonymic transition," that is, by preselecting a series of passwords (such as blue, soul, downgoing) for his Erläuterung of Trakl's poems; those passwords allow him to glide from one poem to the next-all in the name of the "unspoken" poem that the Erörterung is claiming to situate. For the moment, the reference to rhythm is equally troubling: just as Heidegger insists that Hölderlin's "Der Ister" appears to flow back to its source, from the Black Sea to Donau-Eschingen, and that the river is both at home in Schwabenland and heading into the foreign East at once, he will also insist that rhythm is always and everywhere Gepräge, or "coinage," the effect of an imprinting tuv po~ . The ambiguity of undulation will always submit to a typology of the singular-unifying-one that gathers. For Derrida, by contrast, the poem will neither gather at a single point nor flow forward and backward at once. It will space itself across multiple undecidable differences: [Wildheit] into the lives of brothers, sisters, and lovers. These two strokes, as well as the pain that accompanies the singing of them, are, it seems to me, the heart of the matter. They are what has "magnetized" Derrida from the outset of the Geschlecht series. When Derrida writes that everything "has already been decided" in these opening pages of Heidegger's "Language in the Poem," I therefore insert the caution: almost decided, inasmuch as one should never underestimate the strangeness of the brother-sister theme and of Geschlecht as such in Heidegger, which retains its astonishing character to the end.
After noting the importance for Heidegger of the line "Es ist die Seele ein Fremdes auf Erden, [It is something strange, the soul upon earth]" from "Springtime of the Soul," Derrida decides to "precipitate" matters, to move more quickly, even though he realizes that this is, in a sense, to emulate Heidegger's own gesture. Heidegger designates the proper "place" of Trakl's unspoken poem, its singular lieu or Ort, which will be hospitable to the emphatic oneness of the "o n e Geschlecht," by the name Abgeschiedenheit [apartness]. 16 Heidegger follows the stranger-der Fremdling, though not really the "Yet the twofold of the siblings in the human Geschlecht lies concealed in this more tranquil childhood. In apartness, the spirit of evil is neither annihilated and denied nor liberated and affirmed. Evil is transformed.
In order to survive such a transformation, the soul must turn toward the greatness of its essence. The magnitude of its greatness is defined by the spirit of apartness. Apartness is the gathering through which the human essence is brought to safe harbor in its more tranquil childhood, a childhood protected in the dawn of another beginning. As gathering, apartness has the essence of place." The first sense of the "response" is that Derrida is promising to answer the question later in the seminar-and that is doubtless his intention, inasmuch as he pledges to move through Heidegger's 1953 Trakl text quite thoroughly, and there is much work remaining to be done. Yet the second sense of the response is perhaps the more telling one: any response to the when? question will always have to come later, inasmuch as a fatal anachrony is at work in the two strokes-just as there is in the logic of any supplement. For example, bad or merely derivative writing always comes first, whereas good writing, primal writing, comes but lately, after the fact, in old age perhaps.
So too the supplement of the second stroke, the accursed supplement, is impossible to locate in time, in some sort of sequence, and in any kind of historical narrative.
What sense are we to make of Heidegger's insistence that there is a more tranquil childhood to which a new Geschlecht, a Geschlecht that is one, will be able to revert? Can we understand that reversion as anything other than a regression to the period of latency? If the second Schlag drives the concordant twofold of brother and sister into unchained individuation and isola- The final page of Geschlecht III (page 32 spilling over onto page 33 with the single word remarquer) fragments into very brief paragraphs, all of them pointing toward the utter strangeness of that simplicity of the sexes which ostensibly prevails prior to the curse. It is as though Derrida wants us to remember the promise, made in Geschlecht I, of a predual, predifferential sexuality, positive in its intention and mighty in its essence. Yet Heidegger appears to leave us instead with the more gentle childhood of a harmonious twofold-strange, foreign, unheard-of, no doubt; yet perhaps also idyllic, bucolic, oneiric, and ultimately domestic and even domesticated.
E i n Geschlecht?
The place of Abgeschiedenheit, a place that harbors a notso-gentle death and decease, perhaps even a perishing, cannot be named, says Derrida, but can only be pointed to; he ends by promising a "second step" in his exposition that will make all this clearer, a "second step" à . . . remarquer. Every mark, according to deconstruction, already involves a remarking. Only if the remaining pages of the seminar's transcription turn up will we know how that re-marking in fact occurred, although, in one sense, Of Spirit may be considered as a remarkable re-marking all its own. After all, Of Spirit follows hard on the heels of those seminars transcribed-in part-as Geschlecht III. Allow me then to adduce here a few remarks on Of Spirit, before coming to a close.
After the past 20 years, it is necessary for us to read and study Derrida (1987, 102; 1989, 63) It is fair to say that the negative thesis of Derrida's Of Spirit- (1987, 124-27; 1989, 78-80) , he fails to see the radicality of its pain and suffering-its languishing, which is the proper subject of my own most recent work. 20 observe now a whole second set of marginal notes. I scribbled them into the margins wherever and whenever Derrida "promises" to take up, once again and elsewhere, "with greater patience" (thereby "rendering greater justice") Heidegger's Trakl interpretation (1987, 137, 178; 1989, 86-87, 108) .
Those marginalia of mine, reminders to myself about Derrida's promise, invariably refer to the sister or to "the femininity of the soul" in both Trakl's poetry and Heidegger's placement of it (1987, 172; 1989, 105) . One last point concerning Of Spirit. In order to stress the importance of this work for Heidegger interpretation today, and the importance of Trakl for that interpretation, I want to point to that long footnote in the Trakl chapter of Of Spirit that is dedicated to Françoise Dastur. There Derrida develops, more forcefully than anywhere else, the positive thesis of the book:
prior to the language of all questioning, he suggests, there is the memory of a language of affirmation-a language of address [Zuspruch] , assent [Zusage] , and the yes (1987, 147-54; 1989, 129-36) . That affirmative thought too, it seems to me, has a long and rich life ahead of it.
But now to conclude-with a final apologia. (Krell 2006, espec, 351-54) . In what follows, I will cite the 33-page typescript of
Geschlecht III by page number in parentheses in the body of my text. Heidegger (1978) . This text was later included as chapter 11 of Intimations of Mortality: Time, Truth, and Finitude in Heidegger's Thinking of Being (Krell 1986 ). I was able to dedicate that chapter to Derrida just before the book went to print.
See the Proceedings of the Essex conference, published in Volume 17 of Research in
Phenomenology (1987) . 6. For the sake of brevity and convenience, I will revert to my summary of Geschlecht III in the earlier article (in Epoché), with apologies for the inevitable repetition. I will bypass those remarks of mine in the margins of Derrida's typescript that are mere references to other relevant texts in Heidegger's oeuvre or mere objections to the use of this or that translation. It is clear to me now, if it was not then, that Derrida knew perfectly well about these other texts, and that the translation issues were (and remain) controversial.
